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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model to examine the implication of
credit market imperfections when considering the massive variation of
agricultural labor productivity across countries. The development of
credit markets enables more agents to acquire skills to work in non-
agricultural sectors. The expansion of the sectors decreases the labor
supply to agriculture as well as increases the supply of modern in-
termediate inputs to agriculture. Agricultural producers accordingly
substitute the relatively cheap intermediate inputs for labor to pro-
duce a given level of an agricultural good, and, thereby, output per
worker in agriculture is improved. Poor countries with less-developed
credit markets are, therefore, far less productive in agriculture than
rich countries with well-developed credit markets.
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1 Introduction
Cross-country labor productivity dierences are enormous in agriculture but
small in non-agriculture. Although labor productivity in agriculture is gen-
erally smaller than that in non-agriculture in almost all countries, the fact
is particularly true in poor countries (Caselli 2005; Restuccia . 2008). As
poor countries allocate their substantial labor force to agriculture, in which
they are especially unproductive, the low labor productivity in the sector is
responsible for their poverty and low aggregate productivity. Caselli (2005)
argues that, if the agricultural labor productivity level in poor countries
were the same as that in the U.S., world income inequality would virtually
disappear. This result suggests the importance of agricultural productivity
dierences in understanding world income disparity. The aim of this paper
is to present a simple theoretical model to demonstrate why labor produc-
tivity gaps between rich and poor countries are large to a great extent in
agriculture.
One noticeable observation is that high agricultural labor productivity
in rich countries is associated with the intensive use of intermediate inputs
provided by non-agriculture. It is widely recognized that industrial develop-
ment enables the supply of labor-saving intermediate inputs to agriculture
at reasonable prices and that the intensive use of the intermediate inputs
to produce a given quantity of agricultural output enhances agricultural la-
bor productivity.1 As Matsuyama (1992) also points out, the development
of non-agriculture improves agricultural productivity through the supply of
better and less expensive intermediate inputs, such as fertilizer, pesticide,
drain pipes, and harvesting equipment, and analyzing models incorporat-
ing the feedback eects from non-agriculture to agriculture is essential for
understanding the roles of agriculture in economic development.
Building on these insights, this paper proposes a simple theory to explain
the massive variation in agricultural labor productivity dierences across
countries. The key elements of the model are non-homothetic preference and
credit market imperfections. The rst element, non-homothetic preference,
is a tradition of development economics, and its implication is clear. Coun-
tries with low agricultural productivity have a large share of employment
in the sector to meet food demand. The second element of credit market
1Notable literature includes Johnston and Mellor (1961), Gardner (1992), Johnson
(1997), and Restuccia et al. (2008). For a case study in Japan, see Murata (2002).
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imperfections plays central roles in this model. Agents have to invest in ed-
ucation and acquire special skills, or human capital, in order to work in a
non-agricultural sector. Tight credit constraints make many agents impos-
sible to cover costs of the human capital investment, and they have, thus,
no choice but to work in agriculture, even though they are aware of higher
returns from non-agricultural work.
In the model presented in this paper, credit market development enhances
agricultural labor productivity through the expansion of non-agriculture.
The development of credit markets enables more agents to invest in hu-
man capital and work in non-agriculture. The expansion of non-agriculture
decreases labor supply to agriculture, increases supply of intermediate in-
puts to the sector, and thereby reduces the prices of the intermediate inputs
relative to labor wages in agriculture. Because farmers substitute relatively
cheap intermediate inputs for labor in order to produce a given level of an
agricultural good, the agricultural labor productivity increases. Rich coun-
tries with well-developed credit markets, therefore, have high agricultural
labor productivity, low labor share in agriculture, and low intermediate in-
put prices. These results are consistent with the data by Caselli (2005) and
Restuccia et al. (2008).
Economists have studied interactions between agriculture and non-agriculture
to better understand the large productivity dierences in agriculture and
structural transformation of agricultural production. Murata (2002) devel-
ops a model with interdependence of agriculture and non-agriculture. The
model can generate multiple equilibria, and the economy may be unluck-
ily trapped into a bad equilibrium, which is characterized by labor-intensive
agricultural production, a low degree of industrialization because of a small
labor force reallocated from agriculture, and limited varieties of industrial
inputs. Restuccia et al. (2008) calibrate a two-sector model and argue that
direct and indirect barriers to modern intermediate input use can account for
the large labor productivity gaps in agriculture across countries. An example
of the direct barriers is the protection of domestic non-agricultural industries
through taris and import quota, which directly raises prices of modern in-
termediate inputs. The indirect barriers are labor market distortions. Higher
costs of migration that impede labor reallocation from agriculture to non-
agriculture, together with institutionally protected urban wages, can make
agricultural labor wages cheaper relative to the prices of the modern inputs.
Such distortions in factor markets, according to Restuccia et al. (2008), play
important roles in explaining the variation of sectoral and aggregate labor
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productivity dierences across countries.2
This study explores a situation in which credit market imperfections are
the source of labor immobility. Relative prices of modern intermediate inputs
in agriculture are determined by the severity of the imperfections. Due to
the imperfect credit markets, labor reallocation does not necessarily continue
until payos from working in agriculture and non-agriculture are equalized;
i.e., the non-arbitrage condition in labor markets does not hold under suf-
ciently imperfect credit markets, which is in contrast to the Restuccia et
al. (2008) model. As already discussed, the current model predicts that, in
poor countries, the prices of intermediate inputs for agriculture are high, the
labor share in agriculture is high, and the labor wages in agriculture are low.
The reason is the inability of the poor to nance human capital investment.
The eects of credit constraints on skill acquisition and occupational
choice are widely studied both theoretically and empirically. For example,
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Ljungqvist (1993) develop models in which credit
constraints prevent human capital investment by the poor and cause un-
skilled poor agents to remain in the same status. On empirical research,
cross-country and panel regressions by Flug et al. (1998) show that credit
market development has signicantly positive eects on school enrollment.3
A theoretical study by Yuki (2008) has close structures to the present study.
He investigates conditions for economies to accumulate human capital and
accomplish the shift of employment and production from traditional agricul-
ture to modern industry by considering an overlapping generations model in
which individuals have non-homothetic preference and the absence of credit
markets inhibits human capital investment to work in modern industry.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and characterizes equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the results, and
Section 4 states the conclusions.
2There are a number of other studies that attempt to account for the large productivity
gaps in agriculture across countries. For example, Adomopoulos (2011) emphasizes the
role played by dierences in transportation systems across countries.
3Knight and Song (2003) also present data showing that credit market imperfections
are a major obstacle for Chinese households to acquire skills to engage in non-agricultural
activities.
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2 The model
This section sets up a model and characterizes equilibria. The model is a one-
shot static model with two sectors, each producing a dierent nal good: an
agricultural good and a manufacturing (non-agricultural) good. The markets
for labor and the agricultural good are closed domestically, while the man-
ufacturing good is internationally tradable at the exogenously given world
price, which is normalized to one. Agents have non-homothetic preference
with subsistence consumption needs in the agricultural good. Agricultural
production uses unskilled labor and an intermediate input supplied by the
manufacturing sector. Imperfect credit markets prevent human capital in-
vestment by the poor, and an extent of the imperfections determines labor
share in the two sectors, the prices of the two goods, the agricultural wage,
the intensity of intermediate input use in agriculture, and labor productivity
in the sector.
2.1 Production technologies
There are two sectors in this economy, agriculture and manufacturing. The
production function of agriculture is
Ya = AaX
L1 a ; (1)
where  2 [0; 1]. Ya is the agricultural output, X is the intermediate input
provided by manufacturing, and La is unskilled labor.
4 As described in In-
troduction, this intermediate input, X, includes chemical fertilizer, pesticide,
and others. Aa is the total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture, which
reects any eect on agricultural productivity that does not come from labor
and the intermediate input use, such as land, climate, and social infrastruc-
tures.
The production function of manufacturing is
Ym = AmLm; (2)
4Using Indian data, Jacoby and Skouas (1997) nd that returns to education in agri-
cultural labor are negligible. Caselli and Coleman (2001) also nd that educational at-
tainment of workers in agriculture is consistently among the bottom 10 of 119 industries
in the U.S. since 1940.
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where Ym is the manufacturing output used as a consumption good or the
agricultural intermediate input, Lm is skilled labor, and Am is its produc-
tivity. The input of capital services is omitted in both agriculture and non-
agriculture. The specication and combination of these types of production
functions is proposed by Restuccia et al. (2008). The markets are competi-
tive, which leads to
pa =
1
Aa
x1 ; (3)
wa = (1  )paAax; (4)
where x  X=La. pa and wa are, respectively, the relative price of the
agricultural good and the wage in agriculture. In manufacturing, wm = Am,
where wm is the wage in manufacturing.
2.2 Agents
There is a continuum of agents with unit mass. They live for two periods
but consume only at the end of the second period. The utility function is,
for some a,
U(ca; cm) =
(
ca if ca  a;
a+ cm if ca > a;
(5)
where ca and cm are consumption of the agricultural and the manufacturing
good, respectively. Agents care only about the agricultural good when they
are poor, but, once they achieve a units of the agricultural good consumption,
they devote all the remaining expenditures to the manufacturing good. This
Stone-Geary utility function is used by Laitner (2000) to generate a demand
pattern satisfying Engel's law.5
Let us consider the occupational choice of agents. They are heterogeneous
only in terms of their initial endowments measured by the manufacturing
good, which are uniformly distributed over the unit interval [0; 1]. In the
rst period, they choose to work either in agriculture as unskilled labor or in
manufacturing as skilled labor through investment in education. The size of
the investment is xed as in Galor and Zeira (1993), Matsuyama (2004), and
Yuki (2008), and I set the size at one. Agent i with his initial endowment ei,
5This utility function provides closed-form expressions of equilibrium values.
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therefore, has to borrow 1   ei in order to become a skilled worker. In the
second period, agents supply labor, consume, and repay their loans. Agents
can lend and borrow at a gross interest rate r  1 determined at international
nancial markets. Since the wealth of agent i at the end of the second period
is wa + rei if he works in agriculture and Am   r(1   ei) if he works in
manufacturing, Am   r(1   ei)  wa + rei must hold for him to work in
manufacturing. That is,
Am   r  wa: (PC)
This inequality (PC) is called the protability constraint by Matsuyama
(2004). When (PC) is binding, working in agriculture and manufacturing
gives agents the same wealth at the end of their second period. No one,
therefore, has a strong incentive favoring work in manufacturing over agri-
culture. On the other hand, all agents are eager to work in manufacturing
when (PC) holds with strict inequality. Notice that, if (PC) is violated, all
agents work in agriculture. However, as a result, the agricultural good is not
produced, since no intermediate input is supplied for agriculture, which can
never be realized in equilibrium.
Although agents can lend and borrow at the interest rate r, there exists
a borrowing limit because borrowers can pledge themselves to repay only
up to a fraction of their income. Specically, in the spirit of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), Aghion et al. (1999), and Matsuyama (2004), I assume that
borrowers are not able to commit to repay more than Am, where  2 [0; 1].
Agent i can borrow and invest in education if and only if
Am  r(1  ei); (BC)
where (BC) stands for the borrowing constraint. The left-hand side is the
maximum he is able to commit to repay, and the right-hand side is the
amount he has to repay.
2.3 Equilibrium
This subsection considers two cases based on whether (PC) is binding or not
and discusses the conditions in which each case can be realized in equilibrium.
Before the two cases are presented, I will state a parameter restriction
used throughout this paper:
a < (1  )Aa


1  (Am   r)

: (6)
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This inequality is likely to hold under small a and r or large Aa and Am. The
inequality ensures the existence of an equilibrium in which (PC) is binding
and all agents consume a units of the agricultural good.
First, let us consider the case in which (PC) is binding. In this case,
a suciently large number of agents work in manufacturing, so that wa is
raised high enough for (PC) to be binding. No one has a strong incentive to
work in manufacturing since the payos from working in agriculture and in
manufacturing are identical. Combining wa = Am   r, (3), and (4) yields
x =

1  (Am   r); (7)
pa =
1
Aa


1  (Am   r)
1 
: (8)
Both the intensity of intermediate input use (x) and the price of the agri-
cultural good (pa) are increasing in Am. Since an improvement of Am raises
the wage in manufacturing, agricultural workers must be compensated with
a higher wage in order to make them indierent between the two occupa-
tions, i.e., (PC) is binding. Farmers then substitute the intermediate input
for labor, which results in the increase in x and pa. Equation (8) also shows
that a higher TFP in agriculture (Aa) is associated with a lower price of the
agricultural good.
The wealth of agent i, Wi, does not depend on his occupation.
Wi = Am   r(1  ei) (9)
= wa + rei: (10)
For simplicity, the following analysis focuses on the case in which all agents
can consume a units of the agricultural good. In this case, W0=pa = (Am  
r)=pa > a, which is equivalent to (6) due to (8). Agents who are able to
work in manufacturing do not need to do so since the results of working in
agriculture and manufacturing are identical. Manufacturing workers, how-
ever, must satisfy (BC), since they have to invest in education in their rst
period. That is, they must satisfy
ei  1  Am
r
: (11)
By the market clearing condition for the agricultural good, Ya = AaLax
 = a,
and (7), the labor share in agriculture is given by
La =
a
Aa


1  (Am   r)
 : (12)
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The labor share is decreasing in Aa, since less labor is required to produce
a units of the agricultural good under a higher Aa. La is also decreasing in
Am, since a higher Am leads to a higher agricultural wage because of the
binding (PC). In order for these variables, x, pa, and La, to constitute an
equilibrium, the number of agents who are able to work in manufacturing
must be greater than or equal to the number of agents who actually work
in manufacturing. Specically, the condition is Lm = 1   La  Am=r. By
(12), the inequality is equivalent to
  r
Am
(
1  a
Aa


1 (Am   r)

)
: (13)
In summary, if (13) holds, then there exists an equilibrium in which (PC)
is binding and all agents consume a units of the agricultural good.6 In the
equilibrium, a degree of the credit market imperfections, , does not have
any eect on key variables, such as the labor share in agriculture (La), the
intensity of intermediate input use in agriculture (x), and the relative price
of the intermediate input (1=pa). This is because credit markets are well-
developed and a suciently large number of agents are able to invest in
education and work in manufacturing. The agricultural wage is as high as
the net return on the human capital investment, Am  r, and no one is there
who strictly prefers to borrow. Further improvement of credit markets has,
hence, no eects on the key variables in the equilibrium.
Next, let us consider the case in which (PC) holds with strict inequality.
All agents strictly prefer to work in manufacturing, but only agents who
satisfy (BC), or (11), actually work in manufacturing, which leads to Lm =
Am=r. In order for (PC) to hold with strict inequality in equilibrium, 
must be small enough such that
 <
r
Am
(
1  a
Aa


1 (Am   r)

)
: (14)
The wealth of agent i at the end of the second period now depends on his
occupation. Letting WAi and W
M
i denote the wealth of agent i obtained by
working in agriculture and manufacturing, respectively,
WAi = wa + rei; (15)
WMi = Am   r(1  ei): (16)
6r = 1:05,  = 0:4, Aa = 1, Am = 2, a = 0:1, and  = 0:6 satisfy both (6) and (13).
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Since (PC) holds with strict inequality, WMi > W
A
i . Let us again nd an
equilibrium in which all agents can achieve an a level of the agricultural
consumption: WA0 =pa = wa=pa > a. Since Ya = a and La = 1   Lm =
1  (Am)=r in equilibrium,
x =
"
a
Aa
 
1  Am
r
# 1 ; (17)
and combining (3) and (17) gives
pa =
1
Aa
"
a
Aa
 
1  Am
r
# 1  : (18)
An increase in Am raises the intensity of intermediate input use in agriculture
(x) and the relative price of the agricultural good (pa). The increase in Am
relaxes the borrowing constraint through raising the pledgeable income Am
and thereby increases the number of agents working in manufacturing. The
consequent reduction in the number of agricultural workers must be com-
pensated with the use of the intermediate input (X) when producing a units
of the agricultural good. The improvement of Am, therefore, raises x, and
pa is raised as a result. An increase of Aa, on the other hand, decreases the
intensity of the intermediate input use in agriculture. The degree of credit
market imperfections determines the number of credit-constrained individ-
uals, which is identical to the number of agricultural workers. Under the
given size of labor, the improvement of Aa reduces the required amount of
the intermediate input (X) in order to produce a units of the agricultural
good, which means the reduction of x. The price of the agricultural good is
low under a high agricultural TFP. The condition for wa=pa > a is equivalent
to  > r=Am by (3), (4), and (17).
In summary, if

r
Am
<  <
r
Am
(
1  a
Aa


1 (Am   r)

)
; (19)
then there exists an equilibrium in which (PC) holds with strict inequality
and all agents consume a units of the agricultural good. In the equilibrium,
the improvement of credit markets enhances the use of the intermediate input
in agriculture through the reduction of the relative price of the input (1=pa).
This is because the improvement enables more agents to invest in education
and work in manufacturing.
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3 Results
This section contains a discussion of the main interest. As described in
the Introduction, labor productivity gaps between developed and developing
countries are extremely large in agriculture. Moreover, credit market imper-
fections are severe in developing countries according to a literature survey
by Banerjee (2003). The model provides an explanation for the large la-
bor productivity dierences in agriculture in terms of imperfections in credit
markets. In addition, as shown in Section 2, the model accounts for other
characteristics of agriculture in poor countries, such as labor-intensive pro-
duction and high intermediate input prices.
The agricultural labor productivity Ya=La = Aax
 in equilibrium is
Ya
La
= Aa


1  (Am   r)

(20)
when (PC) is binding and
Ya
La
=
a
1  Am
r
(21)
when (PC) holds with strict inequality. The agricultural labor productivity
increases in  when  is small. Once  reaches the range of (13), however, the
productivity is independent of  because  has no eects on labor share in
either sector. When credit constraints are so tight that (PC) holds with strict
inequality, the improvement of credit markets enables more agents to invest
in education and increases the number of manufacturing workers. The ex-
pansion of manufacturing lowers the relative price of the intermediate input,
which gives farmers incentive to substitute the relatively cheap intermediate
input for labor in the production of a units of the agricultural good. This is
the mechanism how the improvement of credit markets enhances agricultural
labor productivity. Poor countries with less-developed credit markets are,
therefore, far less productive in agriculture than rich countries with mature
credit markets. In concrete terms, the United States has highly developed
credit markets, and its agricultural labor productivity is one of the highest in
Caselli's (2005) data. In contrast, access to nancial services is quite limited
in Nepal, and its agricultural labor productivity is at a very low level in the
same data set.7
7Ferrari et al. (2007) provide a detailed description on the access to nancial services
in Nepal. For example, only 26 percent of Nepalese households have a bank account.
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Which of the two factors in agricultural production is relatively cheaper,
the modern intermediate input or the agricultural labor, is a major deter-
minant of labor productivity in agriculture. Restuccia et al. (2008) argue
that exogenous variations in barriers to the use of a modern intermediate
input determine the price of the input relative to the agricultural labor wage
and, therefore, account for the large cross-country productivity gaps in agri-
culture. In the present study, the degree of imperfections in credit markets
determines the relative price of the intermediate input and the labor wage
in agriculture. Needless to say, introducing the barriers in the current model
would add another source of agricultural productivity dierences. Speci-
cally, the cost of education is one in the model, but allowing the variations
in the cost would lead to dierences in agricultural labor productivities even
under perfect credit markets. In other words, a larger cost of education,
which corresponds to an indirect barrier in Restuccia et al. (2008), would be
associated with lower agricultural labor productivity.
The total factor productivity in each sector can also inuence agricultural
labor productivity. An improvement of Am has positive eects on agricul-
tural labor productivity regardless of whether (PC) is binding or not. The
increase in Am raises agricultural labor productivity by relaxing the borrow-
ing constraint when it is tight enough and the labor productivity is given
by (21); the rise in Am increases the pledgeable income and enables more
agents to work in manufacturing, which makes the modern intermediate in-
put available to farmers at a cheaper price and thereby increases the labor
productivity in agriculture. A rise in Am also enhances agricultural labor
productivity when credit markets are well-developed and the productivity is
given by (20). This is because a higher Am means higher wage in agricul-
ture when (PC) is binding and farmers substitute the intermediate input for
relatively expensive labor.
An improvement of Aa, on the other hand, has no eects on labor pro-
ductivity when the borrowing constraint is tight and (PC) holds with strict
inequality. The reason is that the number of agricultural workers, or credit-
constrained individuals, is solely determined by the degree of credit market
imperfections, and the amount that the agricultural sector must produce is
the constant a. The results of the comparative statics have an interesting
policy implication. It is often argued that agricultural productivity growth is
a precondition for economies to reallocate labor from agriculture to manufac-
turing and initiate a takeo into modern economic growth. In consideration
of whether government policies should place emphasis on improving the TFP
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of agriculture or manufacturing, however, how the policies aect the borrow-
ing constraints of agents should be carefully examined.
4 Conclusion
Presented in this paper are the implications of credit market imperfections
for the large agricultural labor productivity dierences across countries based
on the well-established theory and evidence that credit market imperfections
are an obstacle for human capital investments. In the model presented here,
agents need to get an education and acquire skills to work in manufacturing
(non-agricultural) sectors. The development of credit markets increases the
number of manufacturing workers, which reduces the relative prices of mod-
ern intermediate inputs in agriculture that are supplied by manufacturing.
This makes it possible for farmers to use the intermediate inputs intensively,
and output per worker in agriculture thereby increases. The model predicts
that, in poor countries with underdeveloped credit markets, agriculture is
labor-intensive, and its labor productivity is remarkably low in comparison
to that of rich countries with mature credit markets.
The model has some policy implications besides the obvious one that
directly improving credit markets enhances agricultural labor productivity.
In particular, the marginal increase in manufacturing TFP always improves
agricultural labor productivity, while the increase in agricultural TFP does
not have much contribution to the improvement of agricultural labor produc-
tivity. The reason is that the improvement of TFP in manufacturing raises
the return of education and improves the ability of agents to repay their
loans, but the improvement of TFP in agriculture does not have such an ef-
fect. Based on the observation that food is a basic necessity, it is often argued
that productivity growth in agriculture is a precondition of industrialization
and a takeo into modern economic growth. However, this result suggests
that, in the discussion of government policies that improve a sectoral TFP,
their eects that operate through credit constraints should be given careful
consideration.
It would be interesting to extend the model to a dynamic setting by spec-
ifying the source of the heterogeneity of agents. There could be additional
insights on timing of agricultural modernization or appropriate government
policies from such a dynamic model. This subject remains for further re-
search.
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